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ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS: REINTEGRATING THE
STUDY OF HUMANS AND NATUREl.2
ROBERT COSTANZA

University of Maryland Institute for Ecological Economics. Center for Environmental and Estuarine Studies.
Box 38. Solomons. Maryland 20688-0038 USA. and
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Abstract. Ecological economics is a transdisciplinary effort to link the natural and
social sciences broadly. and especially ecology and economics, The goal is to develop a
deeper understanding of the complex linkages between ecological and economic systems.
and to use that understanding to develop effective policies that will lead to a world that is
ecologically sustainable, has a fair distribution of resources (both among groups and generations of humans and between humans and other species). and efficiently allocates scarce
resources including "natural capital." This will require new approaches that are comprehensive, adaptive, integrative, multi-scale, and pluralistic, and that acknowledge the huge
uncertainties involved. Examples of integrated assessment and modeling studies at local,
regional, and global scales are discussed as cases that both require and force the integration
of ecology and economics and help to build common understanding of linked ecologicaleconomic systems.
Key words: aggregation error; cultural vs. genetic evolution; ecological economics; ecological
sustainability; hierarchy of scales; history of ecology; models. conceptual vs. analytic; modeling as
a consensus-building tool; modeling complex systems; natural capital.
ECOLOGY AND THE ECONOMY OF NATURE

Ernst Heinrich Haeckel (1834-1919) was the first to
use the word "oecologie," in 1866. In 1870 he produced the first full-fledged definition of "ecology":
By ecology we mean the body of knowledge concerning the economy of nature-the investigation of
the total relations of the animal both to its inorganic
and to its organic environment including above all.
its friendly and inimical relations with those animals
and plants with which it comes directly or indirectly
into contact-in a word, ecology is the study of all
those complex interrelations referred to by Darwin
as the conditions of the struggle for existence.
(Translation in Allee et al. 1949)
Thus even in this initial definition of the field, a deep
conceptual relationship with economics is evident.
Ecology was, in Haeckel's words, the study ofthe economy of nature . Economics, conversely, can be thought
of as the ecology of humans, with a particular emphasis
on how we manage our affairs. But historically the
science of ecology evolved out of biology and ethology
(the science of animal behavior) and thus had very
different intellectual roots from economics. In practical
terms, ecology became the study of the economy of
that part of nature that does not include humans.
t Manuscript received 20 December 1994; revised 10 July
1995; accepted 8 November 1995; final version received 11
January 1996.
2 For reprints of this group of papers, see footnote I. p.
975.

Since Haeckel's early definition, many other definitions of ecology emerged based on changing areas
of interest and emphasis (Mcintosh 1985). When there
was a focus on animal populations, ecology was "the
study of the distribution and abundance of animals"
(Andrewartha and Birch 1954). Later, when ecosystems
became a major focus, ecology was "the study of the
structure and function of ecosystems" (E. P. Odum
1971). But what has remained at the core is the relationship of organisms to their environment. As one of
the dominant species of animals on the planet, Homo
sapiens and its relationship to its environment is obviously well within the scope of ecology by any of its
various definitions.
From the very beginnings of ecology as a science
there have been continuing attempts to incorporate humans and the social sciences. The work of H, T. Odum
(1971), Meadows et al. (1972), Holling (1978), Walters
(1986), and many others is certainly in this tradition.
While these attempts have been very influential (and
often controversial), the vast majority of ecologists
continue to ignore humans in their day-to-day research ,
One might ask why ecologists were not persistent or
effective enough in their attempts to extend ecological
thinking to Homo sapiens.
Likewise in economics and the other social sciences
there is a history of attempts to bring the natural world
back into the picture (Hardesty 1977, Harris 1979, Dunlap 1980, Boulding 1981), but the dominant tendency
has been to consider humans to be somehow outside
the laws and constraints that applied to other animals
and to study humans in relative isolation from the rest
of nature.
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This fragmentation of science into separate, isolated
disciplines is a late 19th- and early 20th-century phenomenon. Before that time there was significant interaction among all aspects of science, and one could say
that science was practiced in a "transdisciplinary" way
(Costanza et al. 1997). But by the end of the 19th
century the trend to increasing specialization and professionalization in science, including economics and
the other social sciences, was well under way (Coats
1993).
What has come to be called the "reductionist" paradigm was beginning to hold sway. This paradigm assumes that the world is separable into relatively isolated units that can be studied and understood on their
own, and then reassembled to give a picture of the
whole. As the complexity of science increased, this was
a very useful idea, since it allowed dividing up the
problem into smaller, more manageable pieces that
could be attacked intensively. Chemists could study
chemistry without being distracted by other aspects of
the systems they were studying. Also, the rapid increase
in the sheer number of scientists who were actively
working made it necessary to organize the work in
some way, and the disciplinary structure seemed a logical and useful way to do this. But once university
departments were set up in the various disciplines, inFernal reinforcement systems came to reward only work
in the discipline. This rapidly led to a reduction in
communication across disciplines and a tendency for
the disciplines to develop their own unique languages,
cultures, and ways of looking at the world. Disciplinary
speciation through isolation had begun to occur.
In economics, this led to a growing isolation from
the natural resource (or land) component of the classical triad of land, labor, and capital, and with it a
growing isolation from the natural sciences. Economics
departments began to reward theory more highly than
applications, and the discipline as a whole attempted
to pattern itself on physics, which was arguably the
most successful example of the advantages of the disciplinary model of organization.
This trend continued in the early through middle 20th
century and, by the time of the renewed environmental
awareness of the 1970s, economics had become highly
specialized and abstracted away from its earlier connections with the natural environment. Textbooks at
the time barely mentioned the environment and concentrated instead on the microeconomics of supply, demand, and price formation and the macroeconomics of
growth in manufactured capital and gross national
product (GNP) .
At the same time, economics was becoming absorbed
with professionalization. As A. W. Coats (1993 :27) noted:
At least since the marginal revolution of the 1870's,
mainstream economists have sought to enhance their
intellectual authority and autonomy by excluding
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certain questions which were either sensitive (such
as the distribution of income and wealth, and the
role of economic power in society) or incapable of
being handled by their preferred methods and techniques, or both. These are precisely the questions
which are emphasized by their professional and lay
critics and, more recently, by many economists who
cannot be dismissed by their professional colleagues
as either ignorant or incompetent.
The story in ecology was somewhat different. As we
have previously noted, ecology is a much younger science, and it has always been more explicitly pluralistic
and interdisciplinary. But its roots were in biology and
the trend in biology was much the same as in other
areas of science. The initial split into botany and zoology was followed by further specialization into biochemistry, biophysics, molecular biology, etc. In ecology itself there was something of a split between the
population ecologists (e.g., Robert MacArthur) who
concentrated on individual populations of organisms,
and systems ecologists (e.g., E. P. and H. T. Odum)
who focused on whole ecosystems. But this split never
got to the point of separation into distinct departments
and diSCiplines, although many academic programs
took on a decided flavor in one direction or the other.
Through all of this, ecologists, more so than any
other diSCipline, have maintained communication
across most of the natural sciences. To study ecosystems, one has to integrate hydrology, soil science, geology, climatology, chemistry, botany, zoology, genetics, and many other disciplines. The dividing line
for many ecologists has been at a particular species,
Homo sapiens. Even though Haeckel's original definition at least implicitly included humans, and many
ecologists over the years have argued and worked to
make this integration operational, for the vast majority
of active ecologists the study of humans is outside their
discipline, left to the social sciences. Indeed, most ecologists have looked for field sites as remote from human
activities as possible to conduct their research.
As Mcintosh (1985:319) points out:

If human factors are beyond ecological consideration, what, then is human ecology? It is not clear
whether ecology will expand to encompass the social
sciences and develop as a meta science of ecology.
The alternative is a more effective interdisciplinary
relationship between ecology and the several social
sciences.
Ecological economics can be seen as an attempt to
build this more effective interdisciplinary relationship
as a bridge to a truly comprehensive science of humans
as a component of nature that will fulfill the early goals
of ecology. It is an attempt to help rectify the tendency
to ignore humans in ecology, while at the same time
rectifying the parallel tendency to ignore the natural
world in the social sciences.
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REINTEGRATING ECOLOGY AND
ECONOMICS FOR SUSTAINABILITY

Ecology and economics have been separate disciplines throughout their recent histories in the 20th century. While each has certainly borrowed theoretical
concepts from the other and shared patterns of thinking
from the other sciences, they have addressed separate
issues, utilized different assumptions to reach answers,
and supported different interests in the policy process.
Recognition of the importance of bringing these domains of thought together and attempting to reintegrate
the natural and social sciences has lead to what we
have been calling "ecological economics." After numerous experiments with joint meetings between economists and ecologists, the International Society for
Ecological Economics (lSEE) was formed in 1988, the
journal Ecological Economics was initiated and published its first issue in February of 1989 (currently publishing 12 issues per year), and major international conferences of ecologists and economists have been held
ever since. Several ecological-economics institutes
have been formed around the world, and a significant
number of books have appeared with the term "ecological economics" in their titles (e.g., Martinez-Alier
1987, Costanza 1991, Peet 1992, Barbier et al. 1994,
Jansson et al. 1994, Krishnan et al. 1995).
Ecological economics is not a single new paradigm
based in shared assumptions and theory. It represents
a commitment among economists, ecologists, and other
academics and practitioners to learn from each other,
to explore new patterns of thinking together, and to
facilitate the derivation and implementation of new
economic and environmental policies. To date, ecological economics has been deliberately conceptually pluralistic even while particular members may prefer one
paradigm over another (Norgaard 1989).
To achieve sustainability, the global community must
deal with new types of problems threatening the future
well-being and existence of Homo sapiens. These problems are fundamentally cross-scale, transcultural, and
transdisciplinary, calling for innovative research approaches and new social institutions (Costanza and
Daly 1987, Common and Perrings 1992, Berkes and
Folke 1994, d' Arge 1994, Holling 1994). This research
needs to be integrated with rather than divorced from
the policy and management process (Golley 1994,
Viederman 1994). Ecological economics addresses the
relationships between ecosystems and economic systems in the broadest sense, in order to develop a deep
understanding of the entire system of humans and nature as a basis for effective policies for sustainability
(Costanza et al. 1991). It takes a holistic "systems"
approach that goes beyond the normal boundaries of
the academic disciplines. This does not imply that disciplinary approaches are rejected, or that the purpose
is to create a new discipline. Ecological economics is
interdisciplinary in the sense that scholars from various
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disciplines collaborate side by side using their own
tools and techniques, and transdisciplinary in the sense
that new theory, tools, and techniques are developed
out of the dialogue to effectively deal with sustainability. It focuses more directly on the problems facing
Homo sapiens and the ecosystems on which we depend
in the longer term. These problems involve:
1) assessing and ensuring that the scale of human
activities within the biosphere is ecologically sustainable;
2) distributing resources and property rights fairly,
both within the current generation of humans and between this and future generations, and also between
humans and other species; and
3) efficiently allocating resources as constrained and
defined by (I) and (2) above, and including both marketed and non-marketed resources, especially ecosystems .
Humans have a special role to play because we are
responsible for understanding our OW;l role in the larger
system and managing it for sustainability (Costanza et
al. 1991). This responsibility is not only an ethical and
a moral issue. Sustaining the environment means saving ourselves, including future generations, since we
are dependent on healthy ecosystems for survival.
Thus, ecological economics is an anthropocentric field
of study in the sense that it is concerned about the
survival and well-being of Homo sapiens on this planet.
It is at the same time biocentric in the sense that it is
concerned about the survival and well-being of all other
life as well (Rapport 1993).
Ecological economics views the socioeconomic system as a part of the overall ecosphere, emphasizing
carrying capacity and scale issues in relation to the
growth of the human population and its activities, and
the development of fair systems of property rights and
wealth distribution.
Uncertainty is recognized as a fundamental characteristic of complex systems, and particular processes
in nature are essentially irreversible (Costanza and
Cornwell 1992, Ludwig et al. 1993, Clark and Munro
1994, Costanza 1994). Instead of locking ourselves into
development paths that may ultimately lead to ecological collapse, we need to conserve and invest in natural
capital (Costanza and Daly 1992), in the sense of keeping our ecological life-support systems and interrelated
socioeconomic systems resilient to change (Hammer et
al. 1993, Holling 1994, Jansson and Jansson 1994, Perrings 1994). Hence, ecological economics has an explicit concern for future generations and long-term sustainability, and works with a broader range of values
than the limited perceptions of the current generation
of humans (although these perceptions are certainly not
ignored). Ethics and equity issues are explored, as well
as differences and similarities between worldviews and
cultures (Berkes and Folke 1994, Turner et al. 1994).
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INTEGRATED ECOLOGICAL-ECONOMIC
MODELING

One key research area in ecological economics is
understanding and modeling the dynamics of linked
ecological and economic systems, ranging in size from
the biosphere as a whole to regional landscapes to local
systems . Integrated ecological-economic systems have
so far received only very limited direct scientific attention . Several current approaches may be relevant to
this problem, and a cooperative synthesis among ecologists, economists, mathematicians, computer scientists, and many others is essential. I briefly describe
general issues of scale and hierarchy in modeling integrated ecological-economic systems along with some
ongoing case studies that attempt to implement this
approach.
New understanding about system dynamics and predictability that has emerged from the study of "complex systems" is creating new tools for modeling interactions between human and natural systems. A range
of techniques has become available through advances
in computer speed and accessibility, and by implementing a broad, interdisciplinary systems view.
"Systems" are groups of interacting, interdependent
parts linked together by exchanges of energy, matter,
and information. "Complex systems" are characterized
'by: (I) strong (usually nonlinear) interactions among
the parts; (2) complex feedback loops that make it difficult to distinguish cause from effect; (3) significant
time and space lags; discontinuities, thresholds and
limits; all resulting in (4) the inability to simply "addup" or aggregate small-scale behavior to arrive at
large-scale results (von Bertalanffy 1968, Rastetter et
al. 1992). Ecological and economic systems both independently exhibit these characteristics of complex
systems. Taken together, linked ecological-economic
systems are devilishly complex.
While almost any subdivision of the universe can be
thought of as a " system," modelers of systems usually
look for boundaries that minimize the interaction between the system under study and the rest of the universe in order to make their job easier. The interactions
between ecological and economic systems are many
and strong. So, while splitting the world into separate
economic and ecological systems is possible, it does
not minimize interactions and is a poor choice of
boundary.
Classical (or reductionist) scientific disciplines tend
to dissect their subject into smaller and smaller isolated
parts in an effort to reduce the problem to its essential
elements. In order to allow the dissection of system
components, it must be assumed that interactions and
feedbacks between system elements are negligible or
that the links are essentially linear so they can be added
up to give the behavior of the whole (von Bertalanffy
1968). Complex systems violate the assumptions of
reductionist techniques and therefore are not well un-
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derstood using the perspective of classical science. In
contrast, "systems analysis" is the scientific method
applied across many disciplines, scales, resolutions,
and system types in an integrative manner.
In economics, for example, a typical distinction is
made between partial equilibrium analysis and general
equilibrium analysis. In partial equilibrium analysis, a
subsystem (a single market) is studied with the underlying assumption that there are no important feedback
loops from other markets. In general equilibrium analysis, on the other hand, the totality of markets is studied
in order to bring out the general interdependence in the
economy. The large-scale, whole-economy, general
equilibrium effects are usually quite different from the
sum of the constituent small-scale, partial equilibrium
effects. Add to this the further complication that in
reality "equilibrium" is never achieved, and one can
begin to see the limitations of classical, reductionist
science in understanding complex systems .
Economic and ecological analysis needs to shift
away from implicit assumptions that eliminate links
within and between economic and natural systems, because, due to the strength of the real-world interactions
among these components, failing to link them can cause
severe misperceptions and indeed policy failures (Costanza 1987). Since reductionist thinking fails in the
quest to understand complex systems, new concepts
and methods must be devised.
To achieve a comprehensive understanding that is
useful for modeling and prediction of linked ecological-economic systems requires the synthesis and integration of several different conceptual frames (Norgaard 1989). As Levins (1966) has described this search
for robustness :
we attempt to treat the same problem with several
alternative models each with different simplifications
. . . Then, if these models, despite their different assumptions, lead to similar results we have what we
call a robust theorem which is relatively free of the
details of the model. Hence our truth is the intersection of independent lies.
Existing modeling approaches can be classified according to a number of criteria, including scale, resolution, generality, realism, and precision. The most useful approach within this spectrum of characteristics depends on the specific goals of the modeling exercise.
I next describe a few examples of how one might match
model characteristics with several of the possible modeling goals relevant for ecological economic systems.
A better appreciation of the range of possible model
characteristics and goals can help to more optimally
match characteristics and goals.
Analysis of complex systems offers great potential
for generating insights into the behavior of linked ecological-economic systems. These insights will be needed to change the behavior of the human population
towards a sustainable pattern, a pattern that works in
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synergy with the life-supporting ecosystems on which
it depends. The next step in the evolution of ecological
economic models is to fully integrate the two fields and
not just transfer methods between them. Clark's (1976,
1981, 1985) bioeconomics work was the start of this
recognition. of the importance of linking the mutually
interacting sub-parts. But much work remains to be
done to bring the two fields and the technology that
supports them to the point where their models can adequately interact. Transdisciplinary collaboration and
cooperative synthesis among natural and social scientists and others will be essential (Norgaard 1989).

Purposes of models
Models are analogous to maps. Like maps, they have
many possible purposes and uses and no one map or
model is right for the entire range of uses (Levins 1966,
Robinson 1991). It is inappropriate to think of models
or maps as anything but crude (but in many cases absolutely essential) abstract representations of complex
territory, whose usefulness can best be judged by their
ability to help solve the navigational problems faced.
Models are essential for policy evaluation, but are often
also misused since there is " . .. the tendency to use
such models as a means of legitimizing rather than
informing policy decisions. By cloaking a policy decision in the ostensibly neutral aura of scientific forecasting, policy-makers can deflect attention from the
normative nature of that decision . .. " (Robinson
1992).
In the case of modeling ecological economic systems, purposes can range from developing simple conceptual models, in order to provide a general understanding of system behavior, to detailed realistic applications aimed at evaluating specific policy proposals. It is inappropriate to judge this whole range of
models by the same criteria. At a minimum, the three
criteria of realism (simulating system behavior in a
qualitatively realistic way), precision (simulating behavior in a quantitatively precise way), and generality
(representing a broad range of systems' behaviors with
the same model) are necessary. Holling (1964) first
described the fundamental trade-offs in modeling
among these three criteria. Later Holling (1966) and
Levins (1966) expanded and further applied this classification. No single model can maximize all three of
these goals, and the choice of which objectives to pursue depends on the fundamental purposes of the model.
Several examples in the literature of ecological and
economic models demonstrate the various ways in
which trade-offs are made between realism, precision,
and generality.
High-generality conceptual models.-In striving for
generality, models must give up some realism and/or
precision. They can do this by simplifying relationships
and/or reducing resolution. Simple linear and nonlinear
economic and ecological models tend to have high generality but low realism and low precision (Clark and
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Munro 1975, Brown and Swierzbinski 1985, Kaitala
and Pohjola 1988, Lines 1989, 1990). Examples include Holling's "4-box" model (Holling 1987), the
"ecological economy" modeJ of Brown and Roughgarden (1992), most conceptual macroeconomic models (Keynes 1936, Lucas 1975), economic-growth models (Solow 1956), and the "evolutionary games" approach. For example, the "ecological economy" model
of Brown and Roughgarden (1992) contains only three
state variables (labor, capital, and "natural resources")
and the relationships among these variables are highly
idealized. But the purpose of the model was not high
realism or precision, but rather to address some basic,
general questions about the limits of economic systems
in the context of their dependence on an ecological
life-support base.
A different trade-off is achieved in the General Ecosystem Model (GEM) developed by Fitz et al. (1996).
This model is intended to be applicable to a whole
range of ecosystems and scales, while maintaining a
fairly high degree of complexity (20 state variables)
and the ability to be used as a module in 'spatially
explicit landscape models (discussed below). Here,
some generality is exchanged for increased realism and
precision.
High-precision analytical models.-Often, one
wants high precision (quantitative correspondence between data and model) and is willing to sacrifice realism and generality. One strategy here is to keep resolution high, but to simplify relationships and deal with
short time frames. Some models strive to strike a balance between mechanistic small-scale models that trace
small fluctuations in a system and more general wholesystem approaches that remove some of the noise from
the signal but do not allow the modeler to trace the
source of system changes. The alternative some ecologists have devised is to identify one or a few properties
that characterize the system as a whole (Wulff and
Ulanowicz 1989). For example, Hannon and Ioiris
(1987) used an economic input-output model to examine relationships between biotic and abiotic stocks
in a marine ecosystem and found that this method allowed them to show the direct and indirect connection
of any species to any other and to the external environment in this system at high precision (but low generality and realism). Also using input-output techniques, Duchin's (1988, 1992) aim was to direct development of industrial production systems to efficiently reduce and recycle waste, in the manner of ecological
systems. Large econometric models (Klein 1971) used
for predicting short-run behavior of the economy belong to this class of models since they are constructed
to fit existing data as closely as possible (at the sacrifice
of generality and realism).
High-realism impact-analysis models.-When the
goal is to develop realistic assessments of the behavior
of specific complex systems, generality and precision
must be relaxed. High-realism models are concerned
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with accurately representing the underlying processes
in a specific system, rather than precisely matching
quantitative behavior or being generally applicable.
Dynamic, nonlinear, evolutionary systems models at
moderate to high resolution generally fall into this category. Coastal physical-biological-chemical models
(Wroblewski and Hofmann 1989), which are used to
investigate nutrient fluxes and contain large amounts
of site-specific data, fall into this category, as do micro
models of behavior of particular business activities .
Another example is Costanza et al.'s (1990) model of
coastal landscape dynamics that included high spatial
and temporal resolution and complex, nonlinear, process dynamics. This model divided a coastal landscape
into l-km 2 cells, each of which contained a processbased, dynamic, ecological simulation model. Flows of
water, sediments, nutrients, and biomass from cell to
cell across the landscape were linked with internal ecosystem dynamics to simulate long-term successional
processes and responses to various human impacts in
a very realistic way. But the model was very site-specific and of only moderate numerical precision.
Further extensions of this general approach in the
Everglades (H. C. Fitz, R. Costanza, and E. Reyes;
unpublished report [1993; The Everglades Model, Task
2 Summary] to the South Florida Water Management
District, West Palm Beach Florida, USA) and the Patuxent River Basin in Maryland (Bockstael et al. 1995)
have demonstrated the utility of simulating the spatially
explicit evolution of complex regional ecological systems using a landscape perspective. Economic components are being developed for the Patuxent model to
reflect human behavior and economic influences (Bockstael et al. 1995). The effects of human intervention
result directly from the conversion of land from one
use to another (e.g., wetlands conversion, residential
development, power-plant siting) or from changes in
the practices that take place within specific land uses
(e.g., adoption of agricultural best management practices, intensification of congestion and automobile
emissions, change in urban water and sewer use, and
storm runoff). Integrated regional models that can address the interactions between humans and the environment with a fairly high degree of realism are becoming quite popular (Groffman and Likens 1994). To
address these impacts in a realistic way, which is essential for many policy purposes, generality and precision must be relaxed.
Moderate-generality and moderate-precision indicator models.-In many types of systems modeling,
the desired outcome is to accurately determine the overall magnitude and direction of change, trading off realism for some moderate amount of generality and precision. For example, aggregate measures of system performance such as standard GNp, environmentally adjusted net national product (or "green NNP") that
includes environmental costs (Maler 1991), and indicators of ecosystem health (Costanza et al. 1992) fit
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into this category. The microcosm systems employed
by Taub (1989) allow some standardization for testing
ecosystem responses and developing ecosystem-performance indices. Taub (1987) notes, however, that
many existing indicators of change in ecosystems are
based on implicit ecological assumptions that have not
been critically tested, either for their generality, realism, or precision.
Complex systems, scale, and hierarchy

In modeling complex systems, the issues of scale
and hierarchy are central (O'Neill et al. 1989, Holling
1992). Some claim that the natural world, the human
species included, contains a convenient hierarchy of
scales based on interaction-minimizing boundaries~
scales ranging from atoms to molecules to cells to organs to organisms to populations to communities to
ecosystems (including economic , and/or human-dominated ecosystems) to bioregions to the global system
and beyond (Allan and Starr 1982, 0 ' Neill et al. 1986).
By studying the similarities of and differences between
different kinds of systems at different scales and resolutions, one might develop hypotheses and test them
against other systems to explore their degree of generality and predictability.
The term "scale" in this context refers to both the
resolution (spatial grain size, time step, or degree of
complication of the model) and the extent (in time,
space, and number of components modeled) of the analysis. The process of "scaling" refers to the application
of information or models developed at one scale to
problems at other scales. In both ecology and economics, primary information and measurements are generally collected at relatively small scales (e.g., small
plots in ecology, individuals or single firms in economics) and that information is then often used to build
models at radically different scales (e.g., regional, national, or global). The process of scaling is directly tied
to the problem of aggregation, (the process of adding
or otherwise combining components) which in complex, nonlinear, discontinuous systems (like ecological
and economic systems) is far from a trivial problem
(O'Neill and Rust 1979, Rastetter et al. 1992).
For example, in applied economics, basic data sets
are usually derived from the national accounts, which
contain data that are linearly aggregated over individuals, companies, or organizations. Sonnenschein
(1974) and Debreu (1974) have shown that, unless one
makes very strong and unrealistic assumptions about
the individual units, the aggregate (large-scale) relations between variables have no resemblance to the
corresponding relations on the smaller scale.
Rastetter et al. (1992) describe and compare three
basic methods for scaling that are applicable to complex systems. All of their methods are attempts to utilize information about the nonlinear small-scale variability in the large-scale models. They list three methods: (1) partial transformations of the fine-scale math-
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ematical relationships to coarse-scale using a
statistical-expectations operator that incorporates the
fine-scale variability; (2) partitioning or subdividing
the system into smaller, more homogeneous parts (i.e.,
spatially explicit modeling); and (3) calibration of the
fine-scale relationships to coarse-scale data, when this
data is available. They go on to suggest a combination
of these methods as the most effective overall method
of scaling in complex systems .
A primary reason for aggregation error in scaling
complex systems is the nonlinear variability in the finescale phenomenon. For example, Rastetter et al. (1992)
give a detailed example of scaling a relationship for
i ndi vidual leaf photosynthesis as a function of radiation
and leaf efficiency to estimate the productivity of the
entire forest canopy. Because of nonlinear variability
in the way individual leaves process light energy, one
cannot simply use the fine-scale relationships among
photosynthesis, radiation, and efficiency along with the
average values for the entire forest to get total forest
productivity without introducing significant aggregation error. One must somehow understand and incorporate this nonlinear fine-scale variability into the
coarse-scale equations using some combination of the
three methods mentioned above. Method 1 (statistical
expectations) implies deriving new coarse-scale equations that incorporate the fine-scale variability. The
problem is that incorporation of this variability often
leads to equations that are extremely complex and cumbersome (Rastetter et al. 1992). Method 2 (partitioning)
implies subdividing the forest into many relatively
more homogeneous levels or zones and applying the
basic fine-scale equations for each partition. This requires a method for adjusting the parameters for each
partition, a choice of the number of partitions (the resolution), and an understanding of the effects of the
choice of resolution and parameters on the results. Both
spatially explicit models and individual-based models
are examples of this method. Method 3 (recalibration)
implies simply recalibrating the fine-scale equations to
coarse-scale data. It presupposes that coarse-scale data
are available (as more than simply the aggregation of
fine-scale data). In many important cases, however, this
coarse-scale data is either extremely limited or is not
available. Thus, while a judicious application of all
three aggregation methods is necessary, from the perspective of complex systems modeling, the partitioning
approach (Method 2) seems to hold particular promise,
because it can take fullest advantage of emerging computer technologies and data bases.
From the scaling perspective, hierarchy theory is a
potentially useful tool for partitioning systems in ways
that minimize aggregation error. According to hierarchy theory, nature can be partitioned into "naturally
occurring" levels that share similar time and space
scales, and that interact with higher and lower levels
in systematic ways. Each level in the hierarchy sees
the higher levels as constraints and the lower levels as

noise. For example, individual organisms see the ecosystem they inhabit as a slowly changing set of constraints and the operation of their component cells and
organs is what matters most to them. However, Norton
and U1anowicz (1992) suggest that what appears to be
"noise" at a lower level could be turned into significant
perturbations on the higher level. This can happen
when a critical mass of components participate in a
"trend," a behavioral pattern that affects the slower
processes at the higher level. The rapid and extensive
human uses of fossil fuels could be seen as such a trend,
causing perturbations at the global atmospheric level,
which might feed back and radically alter the framework of action at the lower level.
Shugart (1989) explains the relationship between
scales:
Clearly, natural patterns in environmental constraints contribute substantially to the spatial pattern
and temporal dynamics of particular ecosystems . ..
these patterns, especially temporal ones, may resonate with natural frequencies of plant growth forms
(i.e., phenology and longevity) to amplify environmental patterns. The simplifying assumptions of hierarchy theory may ease the problem of scaling by
providing a common (but somewhat generalized) set
of rules that could be applied at any scale in the
hierarchy.
To test some of these ideas, we have recently established a Multiscale Experimental Ecosystem Research
Center (MEERC) at the University of Maryland. This
Center will construct a series of "cosms" at several
time, space, and complexity scales and carry out an
integrated experimental and modeling research program aimed at understanding and modeling ecosystems
at each of these scales (from microcosms to mesocosms
to small and large regional watersheds [macrocosms]).
MEERC is focused on assessing the response of these
systems to nutrient and toxicant perturbations, and how
(and why) these responses change with scale. The ultimate goal is to develop and test a set of performance
(health) indicators for these systems, and to develop
and test a set of scaling principles that will allow the
extrapolation of results across scales. Detailed, dynamic simulation models of all the experimental systems
will be developed and the program's experimental design will allow the models to be rigorously tested and
calibrated.
Evolutionary approaches
In modeling the dynamics of complex systems it is
impossi ble to ignore the discontinuities and surprises
that often characterize these systems and the fact that
they operate far from equilibrium in a state of constant
adaptation to changing conditions (Lines 1990, Holland
and Miller 1991, Kay 1991, Rosser 1991, 1992). The
paradigm of evolution has been broadly applied to both
ecological and economic systems (Boulding 1981, Ar-
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thur 1988, Lindgren 1991, Maxwell and Costanza
1993) as a way of formalizing understanding of adaptation and learning behaviors in non-equilibrium dynamic complex systems. The general evolutionary paradigm posits a mechanism for adaptation and learning
in complex systems at any scale using three basic interacting processes: (1) information storage and transmission; (2) generation of new alternatives ; and (3)
selection of superior alternatives according to some
performance criteria.
The evolutionary paradigm is different from the conventional optimization paradigm popular in economics
in at least four important respects (Arthur 1988): (1)
evolution is path dependent, meaning that the detailed
history and dynamics of the system are important; (2)
evolution can achieve multiple equilibria; (3) there is
no guarantee that optimal efficiency or any other optimal performance will be achieved, due in part to path
dependence and sensitivity to perturbations; and (4)
"lock-in" (survival of the first rather than survival of
the fittest) is possible under conditions of increasing
returns. While, as Arthur (1988) notes, "conventional
economic theory is built largely on the assumption of
diminishing returns on the margin (local negative feedbacks)," life itself can be characterized as a positive
feedback, self-reinforcing, autocatalytic process (Kay
1991, Gunther and Folke 1993) and we should expect
increasing returns, lock-in, path dependence, multiple
equilibria, and sub-optimal efficiency to be the rule
rather than the exception in economic and ecological
systems.
Cultural vs. genetic evolution.-In biological evolution, the information-storage medium is the genes,
the generation of new alternatives is by sexual recombination or genetic mutation, and selection is performed by nature according to a criteria of "fitness"
based on reproductive success. The same process of
change occurs in ecological, economic, and cultural
systems, but the elements on which the process works
are different (Boyd and Richardson 1985). For example, in cultural evolution: (1) the storage medium is
the culture-the oral tradition, books, film, or other
storage media for passing on behavioral norms and
belief systems; (2) the generation of new alternatives
is through innovation by individual members or groups
in the culture; and (3) selection is again based on the
reproductive success of the alternatives generated, but
reproduction is carried out by the spread and copying
of the behavior or ideas through learning and imitation
rather than biological reproduction . One may also talk
of "economic" evolution, a subset of cultural evolution
dealing with the generation, storage, and selection of
alternative ways of producing things and allocating that
which is produced . The field of "evolutionary economics" has grown up in the last decade or so based
on these ideas (cf. Day and Groves 1975, Day 1989).
Evolutionary theories in economics have already been
successfully applied to problems of technical change,
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to the development of new institutions, and to the evolution of means of payment.
For large, slow-growing animals like humans, genetic evolution has a built-in bias towards the long run.
Changing the genetic structure of a species requires
that characteristics (phenotypes) be selected and accumulated by differential reproductive success . Behaviors learned or acquired during the lifetime of an
individual cannot be passed on genetically. Genetic
evolution is therefore usually a relatively slow process
requiring many generations to significantly alter a species' physical and biological characteristics.
Cultural evolution is potentially much faster. Technical change is perhaps the most important and fastest
evolving cultural process. Learned behaviors that are
successful, at least in the short term, can be almost
immediately spread to other members of the culture
and passed on in the oral, written, or video record. The
increased speed of adaptation that this process allows
has been largely responsible for Homo sapiens' amazing success at appropriating the resources of the planet.
Vitousek et al. (1986) estimate that humans now directly control from 25 to 40% of the total primary
production of the planet's biosphere, and this is beginning to have significant effects on the biosphere, including changes in global climate and in the planet's
protective ozone shield.
Thus, the costs of this rapid cultural evolution are
potentially significant. Like a car that has increased
speed, humans are in more danger of running off the
road or over a cliff. Cultural evolution lacks the built-in
long-run bias of genetic evolution and is susceptible
to being led by its hyper-efficient short-run adaptability
over a cliff into the abyss.
Another major difference between cultural and genetic evolution may serve as a countervailing bias,
however. As Arrow (1962) has pointed out, cultural
and economic evolution, unlike genetic evolution, can
at least to some extent employ foresight. If society can
see the cliff, perhaps it can be avoided.
While market forces drive adaptive mechanisms
(Kaitala and Pohjola 1988), the systems that evolve are
not necessarily optimal, so the question remains : What
external influences are needed and when should they
be applied in order to achieve an optimum economic
system via evolutionary adaptation? The challenge
faced by ecological economic systems modelers is to
first apply the models to gain foresight, and then to
respond to and manage the system feedbacks in a way
that helps avoid any foreseen cliffs (Berkes and Folke
1994). Devising policy instruments and identifying incentives that can translate this foresight into effective
modifications of the short-run evolutionary dynamics
is the challenge (Costanza 1987).
Evolutionary criteria.-A critical problem in applying the evolutionary paradigm in dynamic models is
defining the selection criteria a priori. In its basic form
the theory of evolution is circular and descriptive
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(Holling 1987). Those species or cultural institutions
or economic activities survive that are the most successful at reproducing themselves. But we only know
which ones were more successful after the fact. To use
the evolutionary paradigm in modeling, we require a
quantitative measure of fitness (or more generally performance) in order to drive the selection process.
Several candidates have been proposed for this function in various systems, ranging from expected economic utility to thermodynamic potential. Thermodynamic potential is interesting as a performance criterion
in complex systems because even very simple chemical
systems can be seen to evolve complex non-equilibrium
structures using this criterion (Prigogine 1972, Nicolis
and Prigogine 1977, 1989), and all systems are (at minimum) thermodynamic systems (in addition to their
other characteristics) so that thermodynamic constraints and principles are applicable across both ecological and economic systems (Eriksson 1991).
This application of the evolutionary paradigm to
thermodynamic systems has led to the development of
far-from-equilibrium thermodynamics and the concept
of "dissipative structures" (Prigogine 1972). An important research question is to determine the range of
applicability of these principles and their appropriate
use in modeling ecological economic systems.
Many dissipative structures follow complicated transient motions. Schneider and Kay (1994) propose a way
to analyze these chaotic behaviors and note that,
"Away from equilibrium, highly ordered stable complex systems can emerge, develop and grow at the expense of more disorder at higher levels in the system's
hierarchy." It has been suggested that the integrity of
far-from-equilibrium systems has to do with the ability
of the system to attain and maintain its (set of) optimum
operating point(s) (Kay 1991). The optimum operating
point(s) reflect a state where self-organizing thermodynamic forces and disorganizing forces of environmental change are balanced. This idea has been elaborated and described as "evolution at the edge of chaos " by Bak and Chen (1991) and Kauffman and Johnson (1991).
The concept that a system may evolve through a
sequence of stable and unstable stages leading to the
formation of new structures seems well suited to ecological economic systems . For example, Gallopin
(1989) stresses that to understand the processes of economic impoverishment" . .. The focus must necessarily shift from the static concept of poverty to the dynamic processes of impoverishment and sustainable development within a context of permanent change . The
dimensions of poverty cannot any longer be reduced
to only the economic or material conditions of living;
the capacity to respond to changes, and the vulnerability of the social groups and ecological systems to
change become central." In a similar fashion Robinson
(1991) argues that sustainability calls for maintenance
of the dynamic capacity to respond adaptively, which

Ecological Applications
Vol. 6, No.4

implies that we should focus more on basic natural and
social processes, than on the particular forms these processes take at any time. Berkes and Folke (1994) have
discussed the capacity to respond to changes in ecological economic systems in terms of institution building, collective actions, cooperation, and social learning. These might be some of the ways to enhance the
capacity for resilience (increase the capacity to recover
from disturbance) in interconnected ecological- economic systems .
INTEGRA TED MODELING AS A
CONSENSus-BUILDING TOOL IN
ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT

It is not enough for groups of academic "experts"
to build integrated models. What is required is a new
role for modeling as a tool in building a broad consensus not only across academic disciplines, but also
between science and policy. More broadly, this process
of stakeholder involvement is a key one to achieving
sustainability. Ethicist John Rawls (Rawls 1971, 1987)
has argued persuasively that policies that represent an
"overlapping consensus" of the interest groups involved in a problem will be fair, and this will result in
their also being effective and resilient. Thus, solutions
to the problems of sustainability will only be robust
(resilient) and effective if they are fair and equitable
(the fair distribution criterion mentioned earlier) to all
of the interest groups involved, including future generations and other species.
Integrated modeling of large regional systems, from
watersheds to continental-scale systems and ultimately
to the global scale, requires input from a very broad
range of people. We need to see the modeling process
as one that involves not only the technical aspects, but
also the sociological aspects involved with using the
process to help build consensus about the way the system works and which management options are most
effective. This consensus needs to extend both across
the gulf separating the relevant academic disciplines
and across the even broader gulf separating the science
and policy communities and the pUblic. Appropriately
designed and appropriately used integrated ecologicaleconomic modeling exercises can help to bridge these
gulfs.
The process of modeling can (and must) also serve
this consensus-building function. It can help to build
mutual understanding, solicit input from a broad range
of stakeholder groups, and maintain a substantive dialogue between members of these groups. In the process of adaptive management, integrated modeling and
consensus building are essential components (Gunderson et at 1995).
The potential to use modeling as a way to build
consensus has been greatly expanded in recent years
by the advent of new, much easier-to-use computers
and modeling software. As just one example, it is now
possible, with graphic, icon-based modeling software
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packages (such as STELLA from High Performance
Systems, Inc, Hannover, New Hampshire, USA) to involve a group of relative modeling novices in the construction of relatively complex models, with a few people competent in modeling acting as facilitators . STELLA uses the simple basic model components of stocks,
flows, auxiliary variables, and functional connections .
The graphic representations of these units are connected and manipulated on the screen to build the basic
structure of the model. This process can be transparent
to a group when the computer screen in projected onto
the wall. Participants can then both follow the model
construction process and contribute their knowledge to
the process . After the basic model structure is developed, the program requires more detailed decisions
about the functional connections between variables.
This process is also transparent to the group, using
well-designed dialogue boxes, and the potential for
both graphic and algebraic input. Once preliminary versions of the model have been constructed, it can be run
to develop understanding of its dynamics and sensitivity, to compare its behavior to data for the system, and
to help decide where best to put additional effort in
improving the model. This can be thought of as an
initial " scoping " step that facilitates broad-based input
and consensus.
Based on this initial "consensus-building" modeldevelopment stage, which focuses on generalism as
described above, it may be appropriate and desirable
to move to a more realistic or precise modeling stage.
This stage could involve more traditional "experts"
and is more concerned with analyzing the details of
specific scenarios or policy options. For example, an
ongoing long-term integrated modeling study of the
Patuxent River watershed in Maryland (Bockstael et
al. 1995) has moved into this "policy analysis" stage
of model development and use. It is still critical to
maintain stakeholder involvement and interaction in
this stage with regular workshops and meetings to discuss model progress and results .
While integrated models aimed at realism and precision are large, complex, and loaded with uncertainties
of various kinds (Costanza et al. 1990, Groffman and
Likens 1994, Bockstael et al. 1995), our abilities to
understand, communicate, and deal with these uncertainties are rapidly improving. It is also important to
remember that while increasing the resolution and complexity of models increases the amount we can say
about a system, it also limits how accurately we can
say it. Model predictability tends to fall with increasing
resolution due to compounding uncertainties (Costanza
and Maxwell 1993). What we are after are models that
optimize their "effectiveness" (Costanza and Sklar
1985) by choosing an intermediate resolution where
the product of predictability and resolution (effectiveness) is maximized.
It is also necessary to place the modeling process
within the larger framework of adaptive management
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(Holling 1978) if it is to be effective. We need to view
the implementation of policy prescriptions in a different, more adaptive way that acknowledges the uncertainty embedded in our models and allows participation
by all the various stakeholder groups. "Adaptive management" views regional development policy and management as "experiments," where interventions at several scales are made to achieve understanding and to
identify and test policy options (Holling 1978, Walters
1986, Lee 1993, Gunderson et al. 1995). This means
that models and policies based on them are not taken
as the ultimate answers , but rather as guiding an adaptive experimentation process with the regional system.
More emphasis is placed on monitoring and feedback
to check and improve the model, rather than using the
model to obfuscate and defend a policy that is not
corresponding to reality. Continuing stakeholder involvement is essential in adaptive management.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank two anonymous reviewers .for helpful
comments on earlier drafts. This paper is a synthesis and
overview of ideas that are more fully developed in a number
of other papers with several co-authors, including Herman
Daly, Carl Folke, Lisa Wainger, Richard Norgaard, and KarlGoran Maler. It contains work funded by a number of projects,
including EPA Cooperative Agreement Number 07-5-251963734, titled " Ecological Economic Modeling and Valuation
of Ecosystems," Nancy Bockstael and Robert Costanza, Project managers, and the EPA-funded University of Maryland
Multiscale Experimental Ecosystem Research Center, Tom
Malone, center director.
LITERATURE CITED

Allee, W. c., A. E. Emerson, O. Park, T. Park, and K. P.
Schmidt. 1949. Principles of animal ecology. Saunders,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA.
Allen, T. F. H., and T. B. Starr. 1982. Hierarchy. University
of Chicago Press, Chicago, Illinois, USA.
Andrewartha, H. G., and L. C. Birch. 1954. The distribution
and abundance of animals. University of Chicago Press,
Chicago, Illinois, USA.
Arrow, K. 1962. The economic implications of learning by
doing. Review of Economic Studies. 29: 155-173.
Arthur, W. B. 1988. Self-reinforcing mechanisms in economics. Pages 9- 31 in P. W. Anderson, K. J. Arrow, and
D. Pines, editors. The economy as an evolving complex
system. Adisson Wesley, Redwood City, California, USA.
Bak, P., and K. Chen. 1991. Self-organized criticality. Scientific American 264:46.
Barbier, E. B., J. C. Burgess, and C. Folke. 1994. Paradise
lost? The ecological economics of biodiversity. Earthscan,
London, England.
Berkes, F. , and C. Folke. 1994. Investing in cultural capital
for sustainable use of natural capital. Pages 128-149 in A.
J. Jansson, M. Hammer, C. Folke, and R. Costanza, editors.
Investing in natural capital: the ecological economics approach to sustainability. Island Press, Washington, D.C. ,
USA .
Bockstael, N. , R. Costanza, I. Strand, W. Boynton, K. Bell,
and L. Wainger. 1995. Ecological economic modeling and
valuation of ecosystems. Ecological Economics 14: 143159.

Boulding, K. E. 1981. Evolutionary economics. Sage, Beverly Hills, California, USA.
Boyd, R. , and P. J. Richardson. 1985. Culture and the evo-

988

ROBERT COSTANZA

lutionary process. University of Chicago Press, Chicago,
Illinois, USA.
Brown, G. M., and J. Roughgarden . 1992. An ecological
economy: notes on harvest and growth. Beijer Discussion
Paper Series Number 12. Beijer International Institute of
Ecological Economics, Stockholm, Sweden .
Brown, G. M., and J. Swierzbinski . 1985. Endangered species, genetic capital and cost-reducing R&D. Pages 111127 in D. O. Hall, N. Myers, and N. S. Margaris, editors.
Economics of ecosystems management. Dr. W. Junk, Dordrecht, The Netherlands.
Clark, C. W. 1976. Mathematical bioeconomics. John Wiley
& Sons, New York, New York, USA.
- - -. 1981. Bioeconomics of the ocean. BioScience 31:
231-237.
- - -. 1985. Bioeconomic modelling and fisheries management. John Wiley & Sons, New York, New York, USA.
Clark, C. W., and G. R. Munro. 1975. The economics of
fishing and modern capital theory : a simplified approach.
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 2:
92-106.
Clark, C. W. , and G. R. Munro. 1994. Renewable resources
as natural capital: the fishery. Pages 343-361 in A. M.
Jansson, M . Hammer, C. Folke, and R. Costanza, editors.
Investing in natural capital: the ecological economics approach to sustainability. Island Press, Washington , D.C. ,
USA .
Coats, A. W. 1993. The sociology and professionalization of
economics. Routledge, New York, New York, USA.
Common, M., and C. Perrings. 1992. Towards an ecological
economics of sustainability. Ecological Economics 6 :7- 34.
Costanza, R. 1987. Social traps and environmental policy.
BioScience 37:407- 412.
- - - , editor. 1991. Ecological economics: the science and
management of sustainability. Columbia University Press,
New York, New York, USA.
- - - . 1994. Three general policies to achieve sustainability. Pages 392-407 in A. M . Jansson, M. Hammer, C.
Folke, and R. Costanza, editors. Investing in natural capital:
the ecological economics approach to sustainability. Island
Press, Washington, D.C., USA.
Costanza, R ., and L. Cornwell. 1992. The 4P approach to
dealing with scientific uncertainty. Environment 34: 12-20.
Costanza, R. , and H. E. Daly. 1987. Toward an ecological
economics. Ecological Modelling 38: 1-7.
Costanza, R., and H. E. Daly. 1992. Natural capital and
sustainable development. Conservation Biology 6:37-46.
Costanza, R., and T. Maxwell . 1993. Resolution and predictability: an approach to the scaling problem. Landscape
Ecology 9:47-57.
Costanza, R. , R. Norgaard, J. Cumberland, H. Daly, and R.
Goodland. 1997. Introduction to ecological economics. St.
Lucie Press, Delray Beach, Florida, USA, in press.
Costanza, R. , B. Norton , and B. J. Haskell, editors. 1992.
Ecosystem health: new goals for environmental management. Island Press, Washington, D.C. , USA.
Costanza, R. , and E H. Sklar. 1985. Articulation, accuracy ,
and effectiveness of mathematical models: a review of
freshwater wetland applications. Ecological Modeling 27 :
45-68.
Costanza, R. , E H. Sklar, and M. L. White. 1990. Modeling
coastal landscape dynamics. BioScience 40:91-107.
d' Arge , R. C. 1994. Sustenance and sustainabiIity: how can
we preserve and consume without major conflict. Pages
113-127 in A. M. Jansson , M. Hammer, C. Folke, and R.
Costanza, editors. Investing in natural capital: the ecological economics approach to sustainability. Island Press,
Washington, D.C., USA.
Day, R. H. 1989. Dynamical systems , adaptation and economic evolution. Modeling Research Group (MRG) Work-

Ecological Applications
Vol. 6, No.4

ing Paper Number M8908. Department of Economics, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California,
USA.
Day, R. H., and T. Groves, editors. 1975. Adaptive economic
models. Academic Press, New York, New York, USA.
Debreu, G. 1974. Excess demand functions. Journal of Mathematical Economics 1:15-23.
Duchin, E 1988. Analyzing structural change in the economy. Pages 113-128 in M. Ciaschini, editor. Input-output
analysis: current developments. Chapman & Hall, London,
England.
- - - . 1992. Industrial input-output analysis: implications
for industrial ecology. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (USA) 89:851-855 .
Dunlap, R. E. 1980. Paradigmatic change in social science:
from human exemptionalism to an ecological paradigm.
American Behavioral Science 24:5-14.
Eriksson , K-E. 1991. Physical foundations of ecological economics. Pages 186-196 in L. O. Hansson and B. Jungen ,
editors. Human responsibility and global change. University of Goteborg Press, Goteborg , Sweden.
Fitz, H. c. , E. B. DeBellevue, R. Costanza, R. Boumann, T.
Maxwell, and L. Wainger. 1996. Development of a general
ecosystem model (GEM) for a range of scales and ecosystems. Ecological Modelling, 88:263-297.
Gallopin, G . C. 1989. Global impoverishment, sustainable
development and the environment: a conceptual approach.
International Social Science Journal 121:375- 397.
Golley, E B. 1994. Rebuilding a humane and ethical decision
system for investing in natural capital. Pages 169- 178 in
A. M. Jansson, M. Hammer, C. Folke, and R. Costanza,
editors. Investing in natural capital: the ecological economics approach to sustainability. Island Press, Washington, D.C., USA.
Groffman, P. M. , and G. E. Likens, editors. 1994. Integrated
regional models: interactions between humans and their
environment. Chapman & Hall, New York, New York,
USA.
Gunderson, L., C. S. Holling, and S. Light, editors. 1995.
Barriers and bridges to the renewal of ecosystems and institutions. Columbia University Press, New York, New
York , USA.
Gunther, E, and C. Folke. 1993. Characteristics of nested
living systems. Journal of Biological Systems 1:257-274.
Hammer, M., A. M. Jansson , and B-O. Jansson. 1993. Diversity change and sustainability : implications for fisheries.
Ambio 22:97-105.
Hannon, B., and C. Joiris. 1987. A seasonal analysis of the
southern North Sea ecosystem. Ecology 70: 1916-1934.
Hardesty, D. L. 1977. Ecological anthropology. John Wiley
& Sons, New York, New York, USA.
Harris, M. 1979. Cultural materialism: the struggle for a
science of culture. Random House, New York, New York,
USA.
Holland, J. H., and J. H. Miller. 1991. Artificial adaptive
agents in economic theory . American Economic Review
81:365- 370.
Holling, C. S. 1964. The analysis of complex population
processes. Canadian Entomologist 96:335-347.
- - - . 1966. The functional response of invertebrate predators to prey density. Memoirs of the Entomological Society of Canada 48.
- - - , editor. 1978. Adaptive environmental assessment
and management. John Wiley & Sons, London, England .
- - - . 1987. Simplifying the complex: the paradigms of
ecological function and structure. European Journal of Operational Research 30: 139-146.
- - - . 1992. Cross-scale morphology, geometry, and dynamics of ecosystems. Ecological Monographs 62:447502.

November 1996

ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS

- - -. 1994. New science and new investments for a sustainable biosphere. Pages 57-73 in A. M. Jansson, M. Hammer, C. Folke, and R. Costanza, editors. Investing in natural
capital: the ecological economics approach to sustainability. Island Press, Washington, D.C ., USA.
Jansson, A . M., M. Hammer, C. Folke, and R. Costanza,
editors. 1994. Investing in natural capital: the ecological
economics approach to sustainability. Island Press, Washington, D.C. , USA.
Jansson, A. M., and B. O. Jansson. 1994. Ecosystem properties as a basis for sustainability. Pages 74-91 in A. M.
Jansson, M. Hammer, C. Folke, and R. Costanza, editors.
Investing in natural capital: the ecological economics approach to sustainability. Island Press, Washington, D.C.,
USA.
Kaitala, v., and M. Pohjola. 1988. Optimal recovery of a
shared resource stock: a differential game model with efficient memory equilibria. Natural Resource Modeling 3:
91-119.
Kauffman, S. A ., and S. Johnson. 1991. Coevolution to the
edge of chaos: coupled fitness landscapes, poised states,
and coevolutionary avalanches. Journal of Theoretical Biology 149:467- 505.
Kay, J. J. 1991. A nonequilibrium thermodynamic framework for discussing ecosystem integrity. Environmental
Management 15:483-495.
Keynes, J. M. 1936. General theory of employment, interest
and money. Harcourt Brace, London , England.
Klein , L. R. 1971. Forecasting and policy evaluation using
large-scale econometric models: the state of the art. In M.
D. Intriligator, editor. Frontiers of quantitative economics.
North-Holland, Amersterdam, The Netherlands.
Krishnan , R. , J. M. Harris, and N. Goodwin, editors. 1995.
A survey of ecological economics. Island Press, Washington, D.C. , USA .
Lee, K. 1993. Compass and the gyroscope. Island Press,
Washington, D.C., USA.
Levins, R. 1966. The strategy of model building in population biology. American Scientist 54:421-431.
Lindgren , K. 1991. Evolutionary phenomena in simple dynamics. Pages 295-312 in C. G. Langton, C. Taylor, J. D.
Farmer, and S. Rasmussen, editors. Artificial life, SFI studies in the sciences of complexity. Volume X. AddisonWesley, London , England.
Lines, M. 1989. Environmental noise and nonlinear models:
a simple macroeconomic example. Economic Notes 19:
376-394.
- - - . 1990. Stochastic stability considerations: a nonlinear example. International Review of Economics and Business 37:219- 233.
Lucas, R. E. 1975. An equilibrium model of the business
cycle . Journal of Political Economy 83 :1113-1145.
Ludwig, D., R. Hilborn, and C. Walters. 1993. Uncertainty,
resource exploitation, and conservation: lessons from history. Science 260: 17,36.
Maler, K-G. 1991. National accounts and environmental resources. Environmental and Resource Economics 1:1-15.
Martinez-Alier, J. 1987. Ecological economics: energy, environment, and society. Blackwell , Oxford, England.
Maxwell, T., and R. Costanza. 1993. An approach to modeling the dynamics of evolutionary self organization. Ecological Modeling 69: 149- 161.
McIntosh, R. P. 1985. The background of ecology: concept
and theory. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, England.
Meadows, D. H. , D. L. Meadows, J. Randers, and W. W.
Behrens. 1972. The limits to growth. Universe, New York,
New York, USA.
Nicolis, G ., and r. Prigogine. 1977. Self organization in non-

989

equilibrium systems. John Wiley & Sons, New York, New
York, USA.
Nicolis, G ., and r. Prigogine. 1989. Exploring complexity.
W. H. Freeman, New York, New York, USA.
Norgaard, R. B. 1989. The case for methodological pluralism. Ecological Economics 1:37-57 .
Norton, B. G., and R. E. Ulanowicz. 1992. Scale and biodiversity policy: a hierarchical approach. Ambio 21 :244249.
Odum, E . P 1971. Fundamentals of ecology. Third edition.
W. B. Saunders, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA.
Odum, H. T. 1971. Environment, power, and society. John
Wiley & Sons, New York, New York, USA.
O'Neill, R. v., D. L. DeAngelis, J. B. Waide, and T. F. H.
Allen. 1986. A hierarchical concept of ecosystems. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, USA.
O'Neill, R. v., A. R. Johnson, and A. W. King . 1989. A
hierarchical framework for the analysis of scale . Landscape
Ecology 3:193-205.
O'Neill, R. V., and B. Rust. 1979. Aggregation error in ecological models. Ecological Modeling 7:91-105.
Peet, John. 1992. Energy and the ecological economics of
sustainability. Island Press, Washington, D.C., USA.
Perrings, C. A. 1994. Biotic diversity, sustainable development, and natural capital. Pages 92-112 in A. M . Jansson, M. Hammer, C. Folke, and R. Costanza; editors. Investing in natural capital: the ecological economics approach to sustainability. Island Press, Washington, D.C.,
USA.
Prigogine, r. 1972. Thermodynamics of evolution . Physics
Today 23:23-28.
Rapport, D. J. 1993 . Book review of Man, Nature, and Technology. Ecological Economics 7:79-83.
Rastetter, E. B., A. W. King, B. J. Cosby, G. M. Hornberger,
R . V. O'Neill, and J. E. Hobbie. 1992. Aggregating finescale ecological knowledge to model coarser-scale attributes of ecosystems. Ecological Applications 2:55-70.
Rawls, J. 1971. A theory of justice. Oxford University Press,
Oxford, England.
- - - . 1987. The idea of an overlapping consensus. Oxford
Journal of Legal Studies 7:1-25.
Robinson, J. B. 1991. Modelling the interactions between
human and natural systems. International Social Science
Journal 130:629-647.
- - -. 1992. Of maps and territories: the use and abuse of
socio-economic modelling in support of decision-making.
Technological Forecasting and Social Change 42: 147-164.
Rosser, J. B. 1991. From catastrophe to chaos: a general
theory of economic discontinuities. Kluwer, Amsterdam,
The Netherlands.
- - - . 1992. The dialogue between the economic and ecologic theories of evolution. Journal of Economic Behavior
and Organization 17:195-215.
Schneider, E. D., and J. J. Kay. 1994. Life as a manifestation
of the second law of thermodynamics. International Journal
of Mathematical and Computer Modelling 19:25-48.
Shugart, H. H. 1989. The role of ecological models in longterm ecological studies. Pages 90-109 in G. E. Likens,
editor. Long-term studies in ecology: approaches and alternatives. Springer-Verlag, New York, New York, USA.
Solow, R. M. 1956. A contribution to the theory of economic
growth. Quarterly Journal of Economics 70:65-94.
Sonnenschein, H. 1974. Market excess demand functions .
Econometrica 40:549-563.
Taub, F. B. 1987. Indicators of change in natural and humanimpacted ecosystems: status. Pages 115-144 in S. Draggan,
J. J. Cohrssen, and R. E. Morrison, editors. Preserving ecological systems : the agenda for long-term research and development. Praeger, New York, New York, USA.
1989. Standardized aquatic microcosm-develop-

990

ROBERT COSTANZA

ment and testing. Pages 47-92 in A. Boudou and F. Ribeyre,
editors. Aquatic ecotoxicology: fundamental concepts and
methodologies. Volume II. CRC Press, Boca Raton , Florida, USA.
Turner, R. K., P. Doktor, and N. Adger. 1994. Sea-level rise
and coastal wetlands in the U.K.: mitigation strategies for
sustainable management. Pages 266-290 in A. M. Jansson,
M. Hammer, C. Folke, and R. Costanza, editors. Investing
in natural capital: the ecological economics approach to
sustainability. Island Press, Washington, D.C., USA.
Viederman, S. 1994. Public policy : challenge to ecological
economics. Pages 467-490 in A. M. Jansson , M. Hammer,
C. Folke, and R. Costanza, editors. Investing in natural
capital: the ecological economics approach to sustainability. Island Press, Washington, D.C., USA .
Vitousek, P. M. , P. R. Ehrlich, A. H. Ehrlich, and P. A. Matson.

Ecological Applications
Vol. 6, No. 4

1986. Human appropriation of the products of photosynthesis. BioScience 36:368-373.
von Bertalanffy, L. 1968. General system theory : foundations, development, applications. George Braziller, New
York, New York, USA.
Walters, C. J. 1986. Adaptive management of renewable resources . McGraw-Hill, New York, New York, USA.
Wroblewski, J. S. , and E. E. Hofmann. 1989. U.S. interdisciplinary modeling studies of coastal-offshore exchange
processes: past and future. Progress in Oceanography 23 :
65-99.
Wulff, F., and R. E. Ulanowicz. 1989. A comparative anatomy of the Baltic Sea and Chesapeake Bay ecosystems.
Pages 232-256 in F. Wulff, J. G. Field, and K. H. Mann,
editors. Network analysis of marine ecology: methods and
applications. Coastal and estuarine studies series. SpringerVerlag, Heidelberg, Germany.

